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An astonishing number of Americans—nearly one out of
every one hundred adults—is behind bars in this country.1 And
many of these offenders are serving extremely long sentences—
sometimes on the order of decades.2 These staggering figures raise
concerns about over-incarceration, excessive punishments, the
neglect of criminal offenders’ humanity, and the fairness of our
criminal justice system. The figures also raise concerns about the
costs of imprisonment, as incarcerating so many individuals and
for such long periods of time is incredibly expensive.3 As a result,
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1 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (2014); cf. E. ANN CARSON,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 7 tbl.6 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf [http://perma.cc/997R-WT5A] (explaining that, “[o]n December 31,
2013, 1.2% of adult males, and 0.9% of males of all ages, were serving sentences in state or
federal prison” and that “the imprisonment rate for U.S. residents of all ages was 478
sentenced prisoners per 100,000, and for U.S. residents age 18 or older it was 623 per
100,000”); Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-
of-america [http://perma.cc/63MU-7KTY] (“Over all, there are now more people under
‘correctional supervision’ in America—more than six million—than were in the Gulag
Archipelago under Stalin at its height. That city of the confined and the controlled,
Lockuptown, is now the second largest in the United States.”).
2 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 24-25, 34, 52-56 (examining
the long prison sentences in U.S. prisons); see also Gopnik, supra note 1 (stating that
“huge numbers of [American prisoners] are serving sentences much longer than those
given for similar crimes anywhere else in the civilized world”).
3 See Brad Plumer, The War on Drugs is Breaking the Justice Department’s
Budget, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/
wp/2013/08/12/prisons-are-breaking-the-justice-departments-budget/ [http://perma.cc/9D
MX-4X6V]; Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, ECONOMIST
(July 22, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16636027/ [http://perma.cc/G2N7-EDRL].
See generally CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT
INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS (Jan. 2012), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/
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sentencing reform is in the air. For example, just this year, bills
were introduced in both the House and Senate that would roll
back federal mandatory minimum sentences for some prisoners
who have committed certain drug offenses.4 Another proposed
reform is the U.S. Department of Justice’s clemency initiative,
which encourages certain prisoners to petition the federal
government for commutation and could result in clemency for
thousands of nonviolent drug offenders.5 But perhaps most
revolutionary of all, the drafters of the Model Penal Code are
proposing that judges be given the power to revisit certain
offenders’ sentences on the ground that society has had second
thoughts about the seriousness of their offenses.6
The American Law Institute (ALI), which promulgates the
Model Penal Code, has adopted a new provision that would
authorize judges to reduce some severe sentences imposed by
other judges over fifteen years ago.7 This “second-look
sentencing” provision is thought to have a number of positive
effects, such as reducing incarceration and consequently
decreasing governmental spending on incarceration.8 It could also
realign a number of long sentences with more recent assessments
of offense seriousness. For example, many Americans now view
drug offenses as much less serious than in previous decades. This
can be seen in several states legalizing the use of marijuana9 and
resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf [http://perma.cc/N3FY-
4REA] (examining the cost of prisons to U.S. taxpayers).
4 See Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong.
(2015); Sentencing Reform Act of 2015 H.R. 3713, 114th Cong. (2015); Smarter
Sentencing Act of 2014, S. 1410, 113th Cong. (2014).
5 See New Clemency Initiative, DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/pardon/
new-clemency-initiative.html [http://perma.cc/2LWJ-YWF5] (last updated Apr. 22, 2015);
Sari Horwitz & Katie Zezima, Justice Department Prepares for Clemency Requests from
Thousands of Inmates, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/justice-department-prepares-for-clemency-requests-from-thousands-
of-inmates/2014/04/21/43237688-c964-11e3-a75e-463587891b57_story.html [http://perma.cc/
7WLN-VELP]. According to some commentators, this “effort has gone almost nowhere.”
President Obama and the Power of Mercy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/opinion/president-obama-and-the-power-of-mercy.html
[http://perma.cc/HTV9-BRFN].
6 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011). This article consistently cites to the publicly available version of
section 305.6 that was approved by the American Law Institute membership in 2011.
See id. As recently as September 2015, though, the drafters of section 305.6 have
proposed further changes to the section. These changes are encompassed in a new draft
that has not yet been approved by the ALI Council or membership. See MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 5, 2015).
7 See id.
8 See infra Part I.
9 Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia have all
legalized marijuana for recreational use. See State Marijuana Laws Map, GOVERNING
(June 19, 2015), http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-
recreational.html [http://perma.cc/PUS2-94ZV]. A number of other states have legalized
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the Obama administration’s plan to grant clemency to a large
number of drug offenders.10 Considering these benefits of second-
look sentencing, it is not surprising that there is significant
support for the new provision.11 In fact, although the drafters
have acknowledged that there are some costs to implementing the
provision—primarily financial and political—there appears to
have been no public criticism of it.12
This article provides a much-needed look at some
questions raised by adopting a second-look sentencing approach.
Preliminarily, the drafters have neglected the age-old interest in
finality—a doctrine, though, that has been somewhat eroded in
recent years.13 More importantly, the drafters have based this
novel second-look sentencing provision at least in part on the idea
that Americans’ views of offense seriousness evolve with time.14
But history demonstrates that many of our moral views about
criminal sentences are cyclical in nature; rather than evolving
toward leniency—or in some other direction—Americans’ views of
offenses like drug use and sexual assault vacillate between very
serious and not so serious.15 And because these are moral views, it
is difficult to determine which view, if any, is true or correct.
There is little persuasive reason, then, to think that new
sentencers will reach more accurate conclusions on offense
seriousness than the original sentencers in any given case. In fact,
the original sentencers are likely in a better position to determine
an offender’s desert, as they can often better assess the offender’s
the use of marijuana for medical purposes or decriminalized possessing small amounts of
marijuana. See id.
10 In fact, President Obama recently granted clemency to a large number of
nonviolent drug offenders. See Sari Horwitz, President Obama Commutes Sentences of 95
Federal Drug Offenders, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/president-obama-commutes-sentences-of-about-100-drug-offenders/
2015/12/18/9b62c91c-a5a3-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html; Sari Horwitz & Juliet
Eilperin, Obama Commutes Sentences of 46 Nonviolent Drug Offenders, WASH. POST (July
13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-commutes-sen
tences-of-46-non-violent-drug-offenders/2015/07/13/b533f61e-2974-11e5-a250-42bd812efc09_
story.html [http://perma.cc/26ST-3EU5]; Ryan J. Reilly, Obama Grants Clemency for Drug
Offenders, Including Four Who Were Set to Die Behind Bars, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17,
2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/17/obama-clemency-drug-
defendants_n_6343722.html [http://perma.cc/2CHD-M74K].
11 See infra Part II.
12 To be fair, awareness of this proposal seems to be rather limited.
13 See Margaret A. Berger, Lessons from DNA: Restriking the Balance Between
Finality and Justice, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF
JUSTICE 112 (David Lazer ed., 2004) (“Undoubtedly, the demonstration that numerous
defendants were wrongfully convicted has made the most dramatic inroad into the case for
finality . . . .”); Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1636 (2008)
(“DNA technology has eroded . . . finality.”).
14 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 75-94.
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culpability and the harm caused to the original public—the public
against which the crime was actually committed. Although the
new sentencer may be in a better position to assess whether, as
time has passed, the offender has been rehabilitated or whether
he still poses a danger to society, these are questions rooted in
utilitarianism rather than in the retributive concern of offense
seriousness. However, the Model Penal Code spells out the
importance of retributivism in determining an offender’s
sentence. Adopting a limiting retributivist approach, the Code
directs sentencers to base their sentencing determinations on the
offender’s desert and, “when reasonably feasible,” utilitarian
considerations within the limits of the offender’s desert.16 Despite
this directive, the new second-look sentencing approach runs
astray of retributivism, as retributivism does not soundly support
modifying offenders’ sentences based on evolving views of offense
seriousness. While utilitarian considerations may certainly justify
second-look sentencing, and while second-look sentencing may
very well be a useful innovation, retributivism does not
substantiate this new approach. Reliable assessments of an
offender’s desert best lie with the decisionmakers in place around
the time the crime was committed.
I. SECOND-LOOK SENTENCING
Drafters of the new Model Penal Code on sentencing have
devised a provision that would allow judges to reduce offenders’
fifteen-year-old sentences. Section 305.6 of the draft Code
provides:
1. The legislature shall authorize a judicial panel or other judicial
decisionmaker to hear and rule upon applications for modification of
sentence from prisoners who have served 15 years of any sentence of
imprisonment.
2. After first eligibility, a prisoner’s right to apply for sentence
modification shall recur at intervals not to exceed 10 years.
. . .
4. Sentence modification under this provision should be viewed as
analogous to a resentencing in light of present circumstances.17 The
16 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007).
17 The comments explain that “the judicial decisionmaker should engage in a
thought process that resembles a de novo sentencing decision.” MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). “The
decisionmaker should not be expected to reconstruct the reasoning behind the original
sentence, or critique the decision of the sentencing judge many years before. . . . [T]he
purpose of § 305.6 is not to review the correctness of the original sentence.” Id.
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inquiry shall be whether the purposes of sentencing [which focus on
retribution but also include other secondary purposes such as
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation]18 would better be served
by a modified sentence than the prisoner’s completion of the original
sentence. The judicial panel or other judicial decisionmaker may adopt
procedures for the screening and dismissal of applications that are
unmeritorious on their face under this standard.
5. The judicial panel or other judicial decisionmaker shall be
empowered to modify any aspect of the original sentence, so long as the
portion of the modified sentence to be served is no more severe than the
remainder of the original sentence. The sentence-modification authority
under this provision shall not be limited by any mandatory-minimum
term of imprisonment under state law.19
In sum, the draft Code encourages jurisdictions to adopt legislation
authorizing the sentencing court to modify the sentences of
offenders who were sentenced at least fifteen years earlier.20
The comments to the draft Code state that there are two
primary reasons that prompted the drafters to fashion such a
novel approach. First, the drafters were concerned about the
“extraordinarily long sentences” imposed in American criminal
cases.21 Indeed, the incarceration rate in the United States is
vastly greater than that of other western democracies,22 and long
18 The actual text of the provision states that “[t]he inquiry shall be whether
the purposes of sentencing in § 1.02(2) would better be served by a modified sentence
than the prisoner’s completion of the original sentence.” MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 305.6 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (emphasis added).
Section 1.02(2) provides:
The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all official
actors in the sentencing system, are:
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual offenders:
(i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to
the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the
blameworthiness of offenders;
(ii) when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender rehabilitation, general
deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, restoration of crime victims and
communities, and reintegration of offenders into the law-abiding community,
provided these goals are pursued within the boundaries of proportionality in
subsection (a)(i); and
(iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to achieve the
applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) . . . .
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i)-(iii) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft.
No. 1, 2007).




22 See id. cmt. a (“American criminal-justice systems make heavy use of lengthy
prison terms—dramatically more so than other Western democracies—and the nation’s
reliance on these severe penalties has greatly increased in the last 40 years.”). The draft
154 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1
prison sentences—especially for drug offenses—regularly span
decades.23 Second, the drafters stated that “[section] 305.6 is
rooted in the belief that governments should be especially
cautious in the use of their powers when imposing penalties that
deprive offenders of their liberty for a substantial portion of their
adult lives.”24 Pursuant to this concern, the drafters opined that
section 305.6 “reflects a profound sense of humility that ought to
operate when punishments are imposed that will reach nearly a
generation into the future, or longer still.”25 They explained that
“[a] second-look mechanism [like section 305.6] is meant to ensure
that these sanctions remain intelligible and justifiable at a point
in time far distant from their original imposition.”26 The drafters’
concerns about sentence length and humility in sentencing are
the centerpiece of this proposal.
Despite the drafters’ finding that there is a pressing need
for a second-look provision like section 305.6, the drafters
identified some costs to enacting such a provision. First,
substantial financial costs could be involved in implementing this
approach.27 Providing resentencing for all offenders—or those who
apply for resentencing—who have sentences extending beyond
fifteen years will require additional time and resources from
already overburdened judges (or other decisionmakers).28 Second,
Code states that “[a]s a proportion of its population, the United States in 2009 confined”
dramatically more people than many other democratic nations. Id. It confined “5 times more
people than the United Kingdom (which has Western Europe’s highest incarceration rate),
6.5 times more than Canada, 9 times more than Germany, 10 times more than Norway and
Sweden, and 12 times more than Japan, Denmark, and Finland.” Id.
23 See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
711 (2005) (explaining that “[s]ome of the most notorious examples [of anti-rescidivist
statutes and mandatory minimums] involve low-level drug offenders and other minor
criminals sentenced to years or even decades in federal prison”); Allegra M. McLeod, The
U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
105, 170 (2012) (stating that “defendants [are] sentenced to decades in prison for relatively
minor theft or drug offenses”); Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the
Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 111 (2003) (“For both violent
offenders . . . or the non-violent drug offenders who fill our nation’s prisons in record
numbers, a decades-long prison sentence is not unusual.” (footnote omitted)).
24 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Tentative




28 Early versions of section 305.6 called on the original sentencing court to
engage in resentencing. See id. There were significant doubts among the membership of
the ALI, though, that this would work in some jurisdictions. See id. There was concern
that this approach “would add to the workload of already overburdened trial courts” and
“that trial judges in some jurisdictions would treat sentence-modification applications as
nuisances, of far lower priority than their pending cases, and would feel pressure to
dispose of the bulk of cases on the papers alone, without a hearing or counsel.” Id. cmt. d.
Further, there was concern about the political vulnerability of some judges and the
possible “politically charged” nature of second-look decisions, and that this would cause
“timorous judges [to] fail to act on meritorious applications” and “that courageous judges
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there are “predictable political risks” associated with asking
judges (or other decisionmakers) to shorten some offenders’
sentences.29 As the comments to section 305.6 explain, “[d]ecisions
to release prisoners short of their maximum available
confinement terms are often unpopular, and even one instance of
serious reoffending by a releasee can focus overwhelming negative
attention upon the releasing authority.”30 Additionally, there is the
concern that section 305.6 may do very little to curb the
troublesome burgeoning imprisonment rates in the United States
because only offenders who might serve more than fifteen years in
prison are eligible for resentencing.31 The commenters estimated
that only about two or three percent of offenders will be able to
take advantage of the provision.32 The commenters also noted,
however, that, “in standing populations,” these offenders will be
more numerous simply because they do not cycle through the
corrections system as quickly.33 This heightens the impact that the
provision could have on rates of imprisonment. In all, the drafters
have concluded that the benefits of implementing section 305.6
outweigh the costs. In fact, there has been a remarkable
consensus that a second-look approach like the one envisioned by
section 305.6 is necessary in our criminal justice system.34
would be voted out of office.” Id. Because of these concerns, the drafters of section 305.6
broadened the possible choice of decisionmakers to “a judicial panel or other judicial
decisionmaker” to encourage jurisdictions to think more broadly about what approach
might work best for them. See id. cmts. a, d.
29 Id. cmt. a.
30 Id. The judges of the ALI seemed so concerned about these political risks that
they convinced the membership to revise an earlier draft of section 305.6 that placed second-
look authority squarely in the courts that originally sentenced the offender. See MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 17-18 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 3, 2010); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011) (“In early drafts of the second-look provision, the sentence-modification power was to
be reposed in ‘a trial court of the jurisdiction in which the prisoner was sentenced.’”).
31 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
32 See id. (“In most existing American criminal-justice systems, offenders
with such sentences make up a tiny fraction of all prison admissions—probably on the
order of two or three percent in most states.”).
33 Id.
34 See id. cmt. c (noting the “near consensus within the Institute that 15 years
was the proper time period for engagement of the second-look authority”); MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING 14 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 3, 2010) (“We may begin with a
foundation of relative consensus. At the broadest conceptual level—before thorny
implementation details are placed in issue—there has been consistent majority sentiment
among the Advisers, [Members Consultative Group], and Council that a second-look
provision of one kind or another, targeted at extremely long prison sentences, should be
included in the [Model Penal Code: Sentencing].”); Margaret Colgate Love & Cecelia
Klingele, First Thoughts about “Second Look” and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions of
the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 859, 873-74 (2011) (“[T]here
now appears to be consensus that courts must have some power to reexamine a lengthy
sentence after a period of years, particularly if the public mood that produced a particularly
harsh sentence has mellowed or the overall legal environment has changed.”).
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One potential drawback of second-look sentencing that the
drafters failed to mention but that they likely did not fail to
consider is that section 305.6 undermines the doctrine of
finality—the notion that a conviction or sentence should be
considered settled and should not be revisited once the ordinary
course of legal appeals has concluded.35 This finality interest is
considered important for several reasons. First, finality is valuable
for promoting deterrence.36 The severity, certainty, and swiftness of
punishment have been said to be central components of deterrence,
so undermining the severity and certainty of punishment—or even
maybe the certainty of the extent of punishment—could undermine
the deterrence value of punishment.37 Finality is also said to serve
the government’s “punitive interests,” meaning that when a
conviction or sentence is revisited at some later time, it may be
difficult for the government to prove its case because witnesses’
memories fade and evidence disappears as time passes.38 It has
also been suggested that finality furthers rehabilitation.39 The
35 See Meghan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL’Y 121, 123 (2014) [hereinafter Ryan, Finality]. Note, however, that “[t]he doctrine
of finality is somewhat difficult to circumscribe.” Id. at 122.
36 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Without finality, the
criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”); Seth F. Kreimer & David
Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA
Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 606 (2002); Ryan, Finality, supra note 35, at 125-26.
37 See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 71 (2005)
(“General deterrent effects depend on a number of factors: the severity of the penalty; the
swiftness with which it is imposed; the probability of being caught and punished . . . .”);
Harold G. Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of
Punishment, 59 SOC. FORCES 471, 486 (1980) (finding that “perceived severity of
punishment . . . is a significant variable” in deterrence and that this “effect . . . is
concentrated among those people who believe the certainty of punishment is relatively
high”); Mark A.R. Kleiman, Community Corrections as the Front Line in Crime Control,
46 UCLA L. REV. 1909, 1918 (1999) (enumerating “severity, certainty, [and] swiftness” as
“the routes to increased deterrence”). Today, however, there is significant skepticism as to
whether severity of sentences furthers deterrence. See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl
Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 143, 146, 189 (2003) (“[N]o consistent body of literature has developed over the last
twenty-five to thirty years indicating that harsh sanctions deter.”). But cf. Grasmick &
Bryjak, supra, at 486; Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived
Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 741 (1989) (“In the
conventional nomenclature of the deterrence literature, our findings suggest that both the
certainty and severity of punishment are deterrents, whereas prior findings generally
suggest that only the former is an effective deterrent.”).
38 See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring);
Ryan, Finality, supra note 35, at 125.
39 See Ryan, Finality, supra note 35, at 126. This sentiment may be contrary to
views held by many modern criminal justice scholars because rehabilitation is often
thought to be furthered by an indeterminate sentencing system. The notion that finality
furthers rehabilitation rests on the rationale that “[b]y remaining firm on the matter of
the offender’s conviction, [finality] allows the offender to turn inward and begin working
on himself rather than continuing to focus on the fight to have his conviction overturned.”
Id.; see also Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that “finality
serves the State’s goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes because ‘[r]ehabilitation
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certainty and finality of a punishment is often essential for an
offender to accept conviction and punishment, and instead of
continuing to fight for his innocence or more lenient sentencing,
he can focus his attention inward on his own transformation.40
Further, finality preserves limited governmental resources.41 As
the drafters of section 305.6 recognized, second-look sentencing
will require considerable resources because, pursuant to the
provision, a group of offenders will be entitled to resentencing,
which requires additional court time and possibly even
government-funded attorneys.42 Lastly, finality is also said to
provide closure for victims.43 It limits the number of times that
victims must recount their stories. Under section 305.6, though,
victims may feel pressured to once again publicly share their
victimizations.44 These many justifications for finality help explain
why the long-respected doctrine can be found woven into many
aspects of criminal law and procedure. The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, for example, places
significant limitations on the petitions for writs of habeas corpus
that federal courts may consider, because the drafters were
demands that the convicted defendant realize that he is justly subject to sanction, that he
stands in need of rehabilitation’” (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 465 U.S. 107, 128 n.32 (1982))).
40 See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453 (Powell, J., concurring); Ryan, Finality,
supra note 35, at 126. In examining the relationship between finality and rehabilitation,
though, it is important to scrutinize the type of rehabilitation that is sought. See Ryan,
Finality, supra note 35, at 144-49. Terms such as “rehabilitation” and “reformation” are
often used interchangeably in the criminal justice literature. SeeMeghan J. Ryan, Science
and the New Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 261, 264-65 n.3 (2015) [hereinafter Ryan,
New Rehabilitation]. It is important to distinguish between change in the offender’s
character and change in the offender’s behavior, though. See Ryan, Finality, supra note
35, at 144-49. While it may be difficult in practice to determine whether an offender’s
character or behavior has changed, whether they have both changed, or whether neither
has changed, understanding the relationship between this change and finality is
important to determine whether finality might bolster or undercut these goals. See id.
41 See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 148-49 (1970) (arguing that “the most
serious single evil with today’s proliferation of collateral attack is its drain upon the
resources of the community”); Ryan, Finality, supra note 35, at 126.
42 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). Section 305.6(3) provides that “[t]he department of
corrections shall ensure that prisoners are notified of their rights under th[e] provision,
and have adequate assistance for the preparation of applications, which may be
provided by nonlawyers.” Id. The provision further states that “[t]he judicial panel or
other judicial decisionmaker shall have discretion to appoint counsel to represent
applicant prisoners who are indigent.” Id.
43 See Seth F. Kreimer, Truth Machines and Consequences: The Light and Dark
Sides of “Accuracy” in Criminal Justice, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 655, 655-56, (2004);
Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 36, at 606; Ryan, Finality, supra note 35, at 126.
44 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011); Ryan, Finality, supra note 35, at 126-27; Anne R. Traum,
Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and Federal Habeas Corpus, 68
MD. L. REV. 545, 585 (2009) (noting “AEDPA’s goal of promoting . . . finality”). Finality
also serves the interests of comity and federalism in some circumstances. See Ryan,
Finality, supra note 35, at 126-27; Traum, supra, at 585.
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concerned about maintaining—or bolstering—the finality of
convictions.45 The finality interest is so strong that several courts
have even concluded that preserving finality trumps examining
colorable claims that convicted offenders are actually innocent
and were wrongly convicted.46 Considering the historical
importance of finality, it is surprising that the drafters failed to
mention it.
Second-look sentencing’s effects on finality, consumption
of governmental resources, potential political divisiveness, and
other costs may be significant, but that does not necessarily mean
that second-look sentencing is unjustified. Indeed, the thoughtful
drafters of section 305.6 have determined that the benefits of the
provision outweigh the costs, and the ALI has already adopted the
draft provision, which would encourage jurisdictions to embrace
second-look sentencing.
II. TREMENDOUS SUPPORT FOR SECOND-LOOK SENTENCING
The consensus in support of section 305.6 extends beyond
the membership of the ALI; it seems that everyone who has
commented on the provision supports it.47 Most of the arguments in
favor of section 305.6 parallel the explanations provided in
comments to the draft provision. For example, pardon attorney
Margaret Colgate Love and Professor Cecelia Klingele have
45 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in various sections of the U.S. Code);
Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1258 (2013)
(“AEDPA, more than previous congressional limitations on habeas corpus, significantly
limits the circumstances under which detained individuals may bring petitions for the
writ. Relying on AEDPA, courts have identified three overarching concerns that justify
these limitations on bringing such a petition: federalism, comity, and finality.”
(footnote omitted)) [hereinafter Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation].
46 See Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Meaning of the
Eighth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); see also, e.g., Noel v. Norris,
322 F.3d 500, 504 (8th Cir. 2003) (relying on the Court’s “reluctance . . . to extend relief to
defendants who might prove their ‘actual innocence,’” and the Court’s “observation that
‘[c]laims of actual innocence pose less of a threat to scarce judicial resources and to
principles of finality and comity than do claims that focus solely on the erroneous imposition
of the death penalty,’” to conclude that “Herrera offers . . . [nothing] to defendants advancing
freestanding claims of newly discovered mitigating evidence” (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298, 324 (1995))); Robison v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256, 267 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a
defendant’s claim based on newly discovered evidence because “‘the existence merely of
newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief
on federal habeas corpus,’ and ‘the Supreme Court’s Herrera opinion does not alter this
entrenched habeas principle’” (quoting Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir.
1998))); Lardie v. Birkett, No. 05-CV-74766-DT, 2008 WL 474072, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19,
2008) (noting that “the Sixth Circuit has ruled that a free-standing claim of actual innocence
based upon newly-discovered evidence does not warrant federal habeas relief” (citing Wright
v. Stegall, No. 05-2419, 2007 WL 2566047, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2007))).
47 Perhaps not surprisingly, however, there is quite a bit of overlap between
ALI membership and commentators on section 305.6.
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highlighted these same virtues of a second-look approach and
concluded that an approach such as the one set forth in section
305.6—one that is “principled and fair” and offers “expedien[cy]”—
“is one worthy of emulation.”48 Professor Sarah French Russell has
offered another justification for the provision, explaining that
“[e]xposing judges to stories of rehabilitation”49—something made
more possible under section 305.6—“humanizes individuals
convicted of serious crimes, and demonstrates to judges that people
are capable of change—even when they have committed horrific
acts.”50 As a result, “[t]hese narratives . . . may make judges more
reluctant in future cases to give up entirely on individuals at the
time of sentencing.”51
Professor Richard Frase has perhaps most thoroughly
analyzed the implications of adopting a second-look sentencing
approach. In an article in the Federal Sentencing Reporter, Frase
elaborated on the justifications for second-look sentencing.52 He
stated that our current “system openly tolerates very long
sentences that have become unjustified due to changed
circumstances.”53 There are “numerous, valid grounds for sentence
modification,” he said, and they “must be accommodated[ ] to avoid
the injustice and waste of sentences that no longer fit the crime
and/or the offender.”54 Like the drafters of section 305.6, Frase
also acknowledged some of the concerns with adopting such a
second-look provision. First, Frase reiterated that adopting such a
provision could impose tremendous costs on a state.55 He
explained that because section 305.6 does not appoint a
gatekeeper to limit the petitions for resentencing pursuant to this
48 Love & Klingele, supra note 34, at 877. Elsewhere, Professor Klingele
concludes that “judicial sentence modification promises to be the most legitimate, and hence
the most sustainable, early release mechanism available today.” Cecelia Klingele, Changing
the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence Modification as a Promising
Method of Early Release, 52WM. &MARYL. REV. 465, 536 (2010).
49 Sarah French Russell, A “Second Look” at Lifetime Incarceration: Narratives of
Rehabilitation and Juvenile Offenders, 31QUINNIPIACL.REV. 489, 519 (2013).
50 Id.; see also Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on
Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 179, 207-08 (2014) (stating that “[s]entence
modification procedures have a sound basis in theory,” that “they offer a measure of
transparency and public accountability not present in other back-end mechanisms for
release,” and that “[t]here is considerable merit in ‘second look’ and similar procedures”).
51 See Russell, supra note 49, at 519.
52 See Richard S. Frase, Second Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal
Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 196-99 (2009).
53 Id. at 200.
54 Id. at 201.
55 See id. at 200 (commenting on an earlier draft of section 305.6—Council Draft
No. 2, 2008—that also mentions the costs of implementing the provision); see also Love &
Klingele, supra note 34, at 875 (noting that the most recent draft of the provision—as of
summer 2011—“acknowledge[d] that there will be a variety of costs associated with
revisiting sentences imposed many years earlier”).
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provision, “it can be assumed that virtually all inmates will file a
petition at some point after they have served fifteen years.”56
While the volume of claims is difficult to estimate, it is not
difficult to conclude that this could easily place a tremendous
burden on courts’ resources.57 Further, Frase pointed out that, to
the extent that criminal defendants employ publicly funded
counsel to assist them in petitioning for section 305.6
resentencings, this could be an additional drain on state
resources.58 Frase also suggested that providing for resentencing
may be worthless in practice.59 Just as it is difficult to predict the
extent to which sentence-modification proceedings will drain state
resources, it is difficult to predict how courts will actually apply a
provision like section 305.6.60 State courts may apply such a
provision so narrowly as to provide sentencing relief in only a tiny
fraction of cases.61 This may cause criminal defendants to become
disillusioned with the practice and may actually increase
disfavored sentencing disparities among criminal offenders.62
Moreover, Frase contended, if courts only rarely reduce sentences
based upon the changed circumstances as authorized by section
305.6, then the tremendously long sentences that currently
plague our nation will not be resolved.63 The final concern with
adopting a section 305.6-like provision that Frase identified is
that creating such a safety valve at the back end of sentencing for
criminal defendants removes an incentive for judges to remain
accountable for the sentences they impose rather than kowtow to
the political pressures of being tough on crime.64 Drawing an
analogy to the safety valve of parole for harsh sentencing in
indeterminate sentencing systems, Frase suggested that the
existence of such a back-end release may translate into judges
imposing more severe sentences than if no such safety valve were
to exist.65 Despite all of these concerns, however, Frase concluded
56 Frase, supra note 52, at 200.
57 See id.
58 See id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (3) (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (offering the current draft’s position on publicly
funded counsel under the provision).
59 See Frase, supra note 52, at 200 (asking: “Even if hearings are granted
with some frequency (and especially if they are not), will inmates rarely see much (or
any) reduction in their sentences?”).
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 See id. (“If relief is highly sporadic, inmates will be (further)
disillusioned . . . and the rare instances of relief will introduce a new form of disparity.”).
63 See id. (“If relief is highly sporadic, . . . unjustified lengthy sentences will
remain in force . . . .”).
64 See id.
65 Id. at 200 (“State experience with parole-abolition guidelines suggests that
when front-end decision makers have to take responsibility for these consequences [of
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that the justifications for adopting a provision like section 305.6
outweigh these disadvantages and that adopting such a provision
is essential “to avoid the injustice and waste of sentences that no
longer fit the crime and/or the offender.”66 This position appears to
represent a consensus among legal commentators on the issue.
III. RETRIBUTION AND THEORIGINAL PUBLIC
It is perhaps not surprising that section 305.6 has received
such an enthusiastic response. To the membership of the ALI,
many sentencing experts, and a good part of the general public,
the staggering number of individuals incarcerated in America is
incredibly concerning.67 Further, the goals that the drafters have
explained as undergirding section 305.6 seem laudable: decreasing
rates of incarceration in America, correcting misconceptions about
the seriousness of certain criminal offenses, and improving
sentences to comport with new and better data about rehabilitation
and future dangerousness.68 Sure, the drafters have identified some
drawbacks of section 305.6—such as the costs it may impose on
courts and that it could fuel criticisms of judicial decisionmakers
employing the provision—but the drafters have concluded that
these costs are justifiable in light of the section’s worthy goals.69
And indeed they very well may be. There is at least one concern
implicated by section 305.6, though, that has not really been
discussed: that section 305.6 undermines the importance of the
original sentencer’s determination of the seriousness of the
criminal offense at issue.70
The comments to section 305.6 explain that “societal
assessments of offense gravity and offender blameworthiness
sometimes shift over the course of a generation or comparable
excessive punishment, spiraling costs, and overcrowding], they tend to legislate,
charge, and impose fewer very severe penalties.”).
66 Id. at 201.
67 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (stating that “[t]he Institute calls for a new approach to
prison release in cases of extraordinarily long sentences [because] . . . American
criminal-justice systems make heavy use of lengthy prison terms—dramatically more
so than other Western democracies—and the nation’s reliance on these severe penalties
has greatly increased in the last 40 years”); supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
68 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmts. a, b (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (explaining some of the reasons for creating
section 305.6).
69 See supra Part I.
70 The Model Penal Code suggests that it is the community’s assessment of
offense seriousness that matters. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. b
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (noting that “proportionality limitations
in a democratic society are best derived through cooperative and collective assessments
of community sentiment”).
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periods.”71 They enlist “drug offenses, homosexual acts as criminal
offenses, . . . [battered-spouse homicides], euthanasia[,] assisted
suicide[,] . . . witchcraft, heresy, adultery, the sale and
consumption of alcohol, and the rendering of aid to fugitive
slaves” as examples of this phenomenon.72 With respect to many
of these examples, the societal shift in the perception of offense
seriousness is virtually undebatable. With respect to other
examples—such as drug offenses and assisted suicide—less of a
consensus exists among the current public that the seriousness of
these offenses has dwindled over time. The comments rightly
state, though, that “[i]t would be an error of arrogance and
ahistoricism to believe that the criminal codes and sentencing
laws of our era have been perfected to reflect only timeless
values.”73 Throughout time, in this nation and across cultures,
moral values have changed.74 It would be surprising if they do not
continue to change as time progresses.
Although the drafters of section 305.6 astutely note that
moral values change over time, any suggestion that past moral
values become irrelevant as time marches forward is troublesome.
Moreover, concluding that today’s moral values are somehow more
true or correct than yesteryear’s moral values seems problematic.
Just as the comments assert that “[i]t would be an error of
arrogance and ahistoricism” to view our past offense-seriousness
determinations as perfect or as reflecting timeless values, it
similarly would be an error of arrogance and ahistoricism to
generally view our current offense-seriousness determinations as
more true or correct than those of years past. Any objective truth
or correctness of offense-seriousness determinations seems
71 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See Paul Bloom, How Do Morals Change?, 464 NATURE 490 (2010) (“[O]ne of
the most interesting aspects of human nature [is] that morals evolve.”); Frank Newport,
Five Things We’ve Learned About Americans and Moral Values, GALLUP (June 8, 2015),
http://www.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/183518/five-things-learned-americans-moral-
values.aspx [http://perma.cc/ZVH5-9A2B] (“Norms surrounding behaviors relating to
sexual behavior and reproduction have been shifting in the U.S. in recent years.”); Steve
Stewart-Williams, Did Morality Evolve?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 2, 2010),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-nature-nurture-nietzsche-blog/201005/did-m
orality-evolve [http://perma.cc/Y4CV-LW7A] (noting that “moral beliefs sometimes change
rapidly over time, both within individuals and within societies”); see also Moral
Relativism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 20, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/moral-relativism/ [http://perma.cc/XQH6-GEMJ] (explaining that, in philosophy,
one aspect of moral relativism is the notion that different societies, and different people,
may have varying moral views on a matter).
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unachievable. In fact, history suggests that many of our views on
the seriousness of offenses are cyclical in nature.75
Our experience with the criminalization of drug use is a
good example of this cycle of perceived offense seriousness. There
were only a handful of laws regulating or prohibiting drugs before
the twentieth century, and enforcement of these laws was rather
insignificant.76 In the 1900s, however, drug laws became more
onerous.77 The Harrison Narcotic Drug Act, “the first major
landmark of the drug wars,” was passed in 1914, and federal
enactment and enforcement of drug laws subsequently began to
swell.78 Ensuing federal legislation introduced severe mandatory
minimum sentences for drug offenses, heightened enforcement,
and even authorized death as punishment for selling heroin to
minors.79 During this period, drug use waxed and waned, most
notably marked by a large measure of acceptance of drug use
among the middle class in the late 1960s and 1970s.80 In 1971,
though, President Nixon announced the country’s “War on
Drugs.”81 Federal efforts to stop drug use continued to grow, and
sentences for violating the drug laws expanded, with the
government imposing even more stringent mandatory minimum
sentences for those convicted of violating drug laws.82 Despite this
steady growth of drug prohibition and enforcement, in recent
75 See Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in
America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1771 (1999) (“Human behaviors, values, and beliefs
oscillate over time, moving back and forth between what are widely seen as
fundamentally different positions.”).
76 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME & PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
355 (1993) (“In the nineteenth century, . . . drug laws hardly mattered.”); see also DAVID F.
MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 8, 10 (1973) (explaining
that “[s]tate laws designed to curb the abuse of morphine and cocaine came mostly in the
last decade of the nineteenth century” and that “there was little effort until after 1900 to
enact a federal law to control the sale and prescription of narcotics”); Richard C. Boldt, Drug
Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and the United Kingdom, 62
S.C. L. REV. 261, 271-72 (2010) (“Although there were several very early attempts by states
and localities to legislate in this area, there were no significant legal restrictions on the
distribution of narcotics until the 1890s.” (footnote omitted)).
77 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 355 (explaining that, while drug laws
were inconsequential in the nineteenth century, “[t]his situation changed radically in
the twentieth century”).
78 See id. at 355-57; PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE
CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 224 (1998) (noting that “drug scares . . . peaked in
the critical year 1914, when the federal government effectively prohibited cocaine and opiate
drugs, and in 1936-37, the time of the national regulation of marijuana”).
79 See Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567 (codified at
21 U.S.C. §§ 174-198a (Supp. 1957)), repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2006); Boldt, supra note 76, at 285-96.
80 See JENKINS, supra note 78, at 224.
81 See Boldt, supra note 76, at 286-87. Later that decade, though, President
Carter called for the decriminalization of marijuana for personal use. See Tonry, supra
note 75, at 1780. President Reagan later renewed the crusade by declaring a “War on
Drugs” in 1982. Ryan, Finality, supra note 35, at 137.
82 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 355-56; Boldt, supra note 76, at 287-88.
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years, these efforts have reversed course. For example, sentences
for drug crimes have been reduced;83 former Attorney General
Eric Holder has instructed federal prosecutors to refrain from
charging certain low-level, nonviolent drug offenders with offense
levels that would trigger mandatory minimum sentences;84 the
Obama administration has announced a plan to grant clemency to
a large number of nonviolent drug offenders;85 and some states
have actually legalized the use of drugs such as marijuana.86 The
second-look sentencing provision of section 305.6 may also largely
be aimed at reducing sentences of drug offenders,87 bolstering this
relatively recent about-face in perceptions about the seriousness of
drug offenses.
A similar cyclical trend can be seen with the enactment
and enforcement of sexual assault laws. There was very little
focus on sexual offenses until the 1940s, when J. Edgar Hoover
shined a light on the offense genre after a series of sexually
83 See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Sorry Seems to Be the Hardest Word: The Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, Crack, and Methamphetamine, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 765, 765 (2011)
(explaining that the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, which Congress passed in 2010, “eliminated
the five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence that previously adhered under federal
law upon a conviction for possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine” and “increased
the amount, in weight, of crack that must be implicated for either a five- or a ten-year
mandatory minimum sentence to apply upon conviction of any of several federal drug
trafficking crimes”); Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission
Votes To Reduce Drug Trafficking Sentences (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140410_
Press_Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/68GQ-M4P3] (“The United States Sentencing Commission
voted today at a public meeting to reduce the sentencing guideline levels applicable to most
federal drug trafficking offenders.”).
84 See Memorandum from the Attorney General, Eric Holder, to the United
States Attorneys and Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division (Aug. 12,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-
policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-
drugcases.pdf [http://perma.cc/KH6E-CULB]; see also Sarah Childress, Feds to Reconsider
Harsh Prison Terms for Drug Offenders, PBS (Apr. 9, 2014, 12:50 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/locked-up-in-america/feds-to-rec
onsider-harsh-prison-terms-for-drug-offenders/ [http://perma.cc/89TK-YBHX] (“In August
2013, Attorney General Eric Holder announced a change in the charging policy for federal
prosecutors, instructing them not to charge low-level, non-violent drug crimes with
offenses that would trigger a mandatory minimum sentence.”).
85 See Sari Horwitz, Justice Department Prepares for Clemency Requests from
Thousands of Inmates, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/justice-department-prepares-for-clemency-requests-from-thousands-
of-inmates/2014/04/21/43237688-c964-11e3-a75e-463587891b57_story.html [http://perma.cc/
9DE6-622F]; Clemency Project Overview and FAQs, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW.,
http://www.nacdl.org/clemencyproject/ [http://perma.cc/R2ME-QC94] (last visited Dec. 11,
2015); supra note 10 and accompanying text.
86 See Josh Barro, D.C., Oregon and Alaska Vote to Legalize Marijuana, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/upshot/marijuana-on-the-ballot-
in-florida-alaska-oregon-and-dc.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/LXM3-6GVK]; Niraj Chokshi,
Why 2014 Was the Year of Pot, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/12/23/why-2014-was-the-year-of-pot/ [http://perma.cc/8UEJ-CUMT].
87 See supra text accompanying note 72.
2015] SECOND-LOOK SENTENCING 165
motivated murders of children.88 Over the course of a couple of
decades, states passed “sexual psychopathy” laws to treat sex
offenders and return them to society.89 As time passed, the
pressing concern about sex offenses abated,90 but then, led by
feminists of the time, swelled again in the 1970s.91 After once
again subsiding, concern about sex offenses grew anew.92 In the
1980s, punishing sexual assaults was once again set as a
criminal justice priority.93 And since approximately 1990, states
have imposed more stringent sentences for sex offenders.94
Of course it is ordinarily difficult to discern whether
differences in sentencing reflect changing views about offense
seriousness or changing philosophical views on the purposes of
punishment. Under the theory of retribution, the seriousness of a
punishment should reflect the offender’s desert, but other
considerations, like deterrence and rehabilitation, drive
punishment under utilitarian views.95 Retribution, or at least
some version of it, can be tied to the earliest legal punishments.96
In the early 1900s, though, utilitarian ideals crowded out
88 See Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME &
JUST. 43, 53 (1998); see also JENKINS, supra note 78, at 221, 224 (suggesting that sex
crime panics occurred in the 1910s, 1940s, and 1980s; remarking that it is somewhat
surprising that sex offenses were “treated with . . . relative indifference during the
intervening decades”; and explaining that “[c]oncern about sex crimes was at its lowest
during periods of relatively high tolerance for sexual experimentation, including the
1920s and especially the sexual revolution under way by the early 1960s”).
89 See Lieb et al., supra note 88, at 53.
90 See id. at 91 (noting that “sexual psychopathy laws came into general
disfavor in the United States by the 1980s”).
91 See id. at 53-54.
92 See id. at 54.
93 See JENKINS, supra note 78, at 190.
94 See Lieb et al., supra note 88, at 44. Further, related civil laws, such as sex
offender registration laws and civil commitment laws for sex offenders, have been
passed in many states. See id.
95 SeeMICHAELMOORE, PLACINGBLAME: AGENERALTHEORYOFCRIMINALLAW 6
(1997) (describing “retributive justice theories” as those that have the purpose of “giv[ing]
those who deserve punishment what they deserve”); LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND
RETRIBUTION 214 (2006) (“To be a retributivist is to recognize that deserved punishment is
an intrinsic good.”); Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1071, 1079 (1964) (explaining that utilitarian aims are achieved “through deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, or some combination of these”); Paul H. Robinson et al., The
Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1942 (2010) (“The past half-century has seen
a continuing debate between ‘retributivists,’ who view deserved punishment as a value in
itself that does not require further justification, and ‘utilitarians’ (or ‘instrumentalists’), who
see punishment as justified only if it brings about a greater good—typically the avoidance of
future crime.”).
96 See IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 13 (1989) (“The history
of the retributive view of punishment begins with the biblical and talmudic ethical and legal
ideas . . . .”); Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2012)
(“The penological purpose of retribution was perhaps the first articulated justification for
legal punishment.”) [hereinafter Ryan, Proximate Retribution].
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retribution as the primary consideration in sentencing offenders.97
During this period, many offenders received less stringent
punishments than in the past. Retribution began gaining ground
again in the mid-1970s, and the harshness of punishments
generally ratcheted upward. This was especially the case with
drug offenses and demonstrates that our views of punishment do
not always evolve over time in the direction of leniency. Today,
most legal scholars believe that retribution dominates sentencing
determinations.98 And retribution remains important under the
Model Penal Code. According to the Code, “[t]he general purposes
of the provisions on sentencing . . . [include] . . . render[ing]
sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to
the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the
blameworthiness of offenders.”99 Only when it is “reasonably
feasible” should sentencers consider utilitarian purposes of
punishment such as deterrence and rehabilitation in sentencing
offenders.100 This approach to sentencing is known as “limiting
retributivism,” and, not surprisingly, retributivism plays an
important, and limiting, role in punishment under this theory.101
Despite the importance of retributivism under the Code,
97 See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution
as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1314-17
(2000); Ryan, Proximate Retribution, supra note 96, at 1055-56 (“[B]eginning in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, consequentialist theories of punishment—
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation—challenged retribution’s position as the
primary justification for punishment . . . . By the beginning of the twentieth century,
consequentialist theories of punishment had firmly replaced retribution as the primary
accepted justification for punishment.”).
98 See Ryan, Proximate Retribution, supra note 96, at 1059 (“[T]oday, many
scholars conclude that retributivism is the leading theory for justifying punishment.”);
see also R A Duff, In Defence of One Type of Retributivism: A Reply to Bagaric and
Amarasekara, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 411, 411 (2000) (“A striking feature of penal
philosophising during the last thirty years has been the revival of retributivism.”);
James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 180-82 (2010)
(arguing that “the [Federal Sentencing] Guidelines’ concern with offenders’
blameworthiness—a combination of harm caused, state of mind, and to a lesser extent,
personal circumstances—reveals their focus on retribution or just deserts”).
99 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW INST. Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007).
100 Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii). Further, in no instance shall a sentence “render
sentences . . . more severe than necessary to achieve the[se] purposes.” Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(iii).
101 See id. § 1.02(2) cmt. b (stating that the MPC “borrows” this approach from
Norval Morris, who “called his theory ‘limiting retributivism,’ because it drew from
retributive—or deontological—considerations to impose limits on the intrusiveness of
utilitarian sentences”); NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 161 (1982)
(“To the limiting retributivist, desert sets the outer limits, upper and lower, of
punishment. It is the reflection of society’s official view of what the criminal
deserves . . . .”); see also NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 58-80 (1974)
(describing an earlier view of limiting retributivism).
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utilitarian ideals are cycling back into fashion.102 In this
environment, commentators have expressed that many sentences
are too long and much punishment is too harsh based on the
offenses at issue. Section 305.6 may be a product of this current
climate of perceived offense-seriousness abatement.
The indeterminable nature of offense seriousness is
certainly problematic, and, to the extent that we care about
retribution, we need to assess who is best positioned to accurately
determine an offender’s desert. Now, there are certainly manifold
varieties of retribution. For example, Herbert Morris has argued
that offenders deserve to be punished because they have shirked
their share of the burdens of the self-restraint required of
individuals in order to maintain law and order.103 Punishment
then restores the equal distribution of these burdens among
citizens.104 Jean Hampton has argued that when an individual
commits a criminal offense, he sends a message to his victim that
the victim is of lesser importance than him.105 Punishment serves
the purpose of expressing to the community that this message is
untrue and that the victim is in fact of equal worth.106
Understandings of retribution such as these, though, generally do
not explain who should be responsible for assessing any
particular offender’s desert and thus determining the appropriate
punishment for that offender. Professor Paul Robinson has
explained that most moral philosophers gauge the amount of an
offender’s desert—at least to the extent that they attempt to do
so—by their own moral intuitions.107 This leads to the question of
who should be determining desert for any particular offender
within the criminal justice system. In practice, judges most often
sentence offenders, although some jurisdictions employ jury
sentencing (and all jurisdictions rely on juries to sentence in
death penalty cases).108 But do these judges possess superior
102 See Jonathan Simon et al., Introduction, in AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME:
RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND ANEW RECONSTRUCTION 10 (Mary Louise Frampton et al. eds.,
2008) (stating that “rehabilitation is back on the table”); Michael Tonry, Purposes and
Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2 (2006); Ryan, New Rehabilitation,
supra note 40, at 289-304.
103 See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 476-78 (1968).
104 See id. It “restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from
the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the debt.” Id. at 478.
105 See Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM
AND ITS CRITICS 12-13 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
106 See id.
107 See Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 148-49 (2008).
108 See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L.
REV. 311, 314-15 (2003) (“For decades, legal scholarship has been overwhelmingly
skeptical toward the practice.”); Meghan J. Ryan, The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role
of Juries in Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Determinations, 64 FLA. L. REV.
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moral intuitions about desert? Judges are not ordinarily trained
in the moral intuitions of desert.109 They may have a sense of the
typical sentence for the type of offense and offender at issue—due
to the existence of sentencing guidelines or the general sentencing
practices in the jurisdiction—but having a sense of what sentence
may be typical differs from having a sense of what sentence is
appropriate. Moreover, sentencing decisions usually do not
explain what part of a sentence is due to desert considerations
and what part is due to other concerns such as deterrence.
Accordingly, judges’ experience in sentencing is of limited use in
determining what punishment an offender actually deserves.
Robinson has argued that there is a better way to assess desert.
Pursuant to his theory of empirical retributivism, an offender’s
desert is assessed based on “the community’s intuitions of justice.
The primary source of the principles [for assessing desert], then,
is empirical research into those factors that drive people’s
assessments of blameworthiness.”110 As Robinson conceded,
though, “[j]ust because the community’s intuitions suggest certain
punishment is doing justice, it does not make it so, even if there is
a strong agreement on those intuitions.”111 Despite this concern,
the Model Penal Code seems to have adopted an approach focused
on the community’s sense of desert.112 It states that the
“proportionality limitations,” which are representative of
retributive constraints, “are best derived through cooperative and
collective assessments of community sentiment.”113 Still, within
the current criminal justice system, there are limited options for
ultimate deciders of desert, namely judges and juries. And their
decisions are usually cabined by the desert decisions of
legislatures, which set limitations on available punishments.
549, 589 (2012) (“A handful of states employ jury sentencing . . . . There are good
reasons for jurisdictions to engage in jury sentencing . . . [,] but the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions leave sentencing to judges’ discretion.”). Interestingly, though,
Alabama law allows a judge to override a jury’s decision and impose capital
punishment even though the jury determined that such a severe punishment was not
warranted. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1981). The Supreme Court’s decision in Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), has called into doubt the constitutionality of this law,
but, even after Ring was decided, Alabama judges continued to employ this judicial
override. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE
OVERRIDE 16 (2011) (noting that, “in 2008, a[ ] [judicial] election year, 30% of the death
sentences imposed in Alabama were the result of judge override”).
109 See Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV.
849, 872-73 (2014) (explaining that judges are not ordinarily trained in moral
decisionmaking).
110 Robinson, supra note 107, at 149 (emphasis added).
111 Id.
112 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
113 Id.
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The ALI’s new provision on second-look sentencing
expands the options for possible desert assessors by unwittingly
highlighting that the options include current judges and juries,
as well as the original judges and juries in cases. To the extent
that we care about retribution, then,114 we must pin the
seriousness assessment to some point in time. The drafters of
section 305.6 have adopted the current time—whenever that
is—as the relevant time for assessing offense seriousness. If we
were consistently inching toward greater truth and correctness,
that might make sense. But recognizing the indeterminacy and
moral relativeness of seriousness determinations suggests that a
different point is more appropriate.
The best juncture for assessing the seriousness of an
offense is the point in time at which the crime was committed, not
fifteen or so years later when a section 305.6 resentencing is
supposed to take place. The crime was committed against the
public at that time; it was committed against that public—the
original public—not against the current public. As a result, the
original public—whether it is represented by a judge or jury
sentencer at the offender’s original trial—is often in a better
position to determine the extent of the harm caused by the
offense. Moreover, the original public—represented by the
original judge or jury—may be more competent to assess the
mental state of the offender, as that public has a better sense of
what societal and moral pressures may have been at play in
influencing offenders of that period. It should be this original
public’s assessment of seriousness that matters, rather than an
assessment by a public against which the crime was not
committed. While there may certainly be overlap between the
constituencies of the original public and the current public, with
at least fifteen years separating these two bodies, it is extremely
unlikely that they will be identical.
That the original public’s assessment of offense
seriousness is the one that matters is not a novel concept;
sentencing experts consistently describe retribution as backward
looking in some respect.115 An offender’s desert is determined as of
114 See supra text accompanying note 99 (explaining that retribution remains
important under the Model Penal Code).
115 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 15 (2003) (“It contends that retribution, a seemingly archaic, backwards-looking goal
dismissed by the champions of rehabilitation at one end of the twentieth century and by
the champions of ‘crime control’ at the other, merits recognition as the central purpose of
criminal punishment.”); Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in
Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1012 (1996) (“[R]etributivism is
deontological and backward-looking. In contrast to forward-looking consequentialist
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the time he commits his crime. Future events are generally
considered irrelevant to this desert determination.116 The drafters’
suggestion that already-sentenced offenders’ deserts change with
the times, then, ignores this fundamental backward-looking
characteristic of retribution. Shifting the decisionmaking from the
original judge or jury to a current one does not solve the
philosophical conundrum as to what an offender’s desert actually
is. Further, it increases the distance between the offense and the
desert assessor, thus generally making desert determinations
more removed from those suffering harms stemming from the
offense and the particular circumstances of the case. This runs
the risk of ignoring the original public harmed by the offense.
Of course, even if the original public is better positioned to
accurately assess desert, the variety of retributivism on which the
Code and section 305.6 rest—limiting retributivism—
acknowledges that our assessments of desert are shaky: “[W]e
lack the moral calipers to say with precision [that] a given
punishment . . . ‘was . . . just.’”117 We can assess an offender’s
desert within only a particular range of certainty, but there is a
risk of error surrounding these determinations. According to the
approaches that justify punishment in the name of what might be, retributivism justifies
punishment in the name of what has been. Punishment strictly predicated on moral
desert is blind to the future.”). It is worth clarifying, however, that when retribution is
referred to as “backward looking,” it seems that it is a reference to the fact that
retribution is not concerned about the consequences flowing from punishment. It does not
by definition state that the original public must determine desert or that a later public
cannot revisit desert. Indeed, as I describe in the next paragraph, information that may
be learned only later could possibly call for revisiting a desert determination. Further,
certain niche applications of retributivism can be more forward looking. See Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 143, 149 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997) (explaining that
“[s]ometimes the wrongfulness of an act is a function of the harm that it brings to a
victim, and sometimes this harm may be lessened through an act of repentance”); infra
note 120 and accompanying text.
116 There are some circumstances in which the future is relevant under a
retributivist theory. See supra note 115. If sentencers have the ability to determine
what additional harms the crime might cause in the future, for example, those harms—
at least to the extent that they are legally relevant (or “proximate”) to the committed
offense—should perhaps be considered in determining the offender’s desert. See
generally Ryan, Proximate Retribution, supra note 96 (suggesting the need for
proximate cause analysis in determining which harms should be considered in
determining an offender’s just deserts).
117 Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 37 (1985); see also MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (relying on
Morris’s theory of limiting retributivism); Christopher Slobogin, Introduction to the
Symposium on the Model Penal Code’s Sentencing Proposals, 61 FLA. L. REV. 665, 671 (2009)
(noting that the draft Code “rejects not only the view that desert should be the sole
determinant of disposition, but also the notion of some desert theorists that there is a single
correct retributive punishment for each offender” (footnote omitted)).
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well accepted principle of parsimony,118 though, if there is
uncertainty surrounding how much punishment an offender
deserves, that offender should be sentenced to the least severe
punishment within that range of uncertainty.
Thus, as displayed in Figure 1, if the defendant actually
deserves a particular punishment (D1), because we cannot be
certain about that level of desert, the defendant should receive
the lowest sentence within the applicable range of uncertainty
(S1). After a second look, however, a judge may very well find
that the defendant is less deserving of punishment (D2) and
therefore sentence him to the lowest possible punishment
within the new applicable range of uncertainty (S2). Note that
this new sentence (S2) lies outside the range of uncertainty
based on the initial determination of desert (D1). Thus, if both
sentencers abided by the parsimony principle, then, according
to the initial desert assessment (D1), the second sentence (S2)
lies outside the initial range of uncertainty. It is, by definition,
a sentence that is too lenient according to the initial desert
assessment (D1). If the principle of parsimony was not observed
at the initial sentencing, and the second-look sentencing is
employed just to correct this oversight, then there may be no
retributive difficulty. But the draft’s suggestion that the desert
assessment may change over time seems to contemplate
118 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007) (noting that the Code “incorporates the principle of ‘parsimony’” and
asserting that “[f]ew can disagree with the principle’s content”).
Figure 1. Displaying how sentences based on the principle of
parsimony vary as assessments of desert change.
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greater movement than just within the uncertainty range of
the initial desert determination (D1).
Neglect of the parsimony principle in the initial sentencing
of an offender is an example of an instance in which a second look
at a sentence may be justified under a retributive framework. In
this case and others, the passage of time between the commission
of the offense and the determination of punishment could
sometimes be useful in bringing to light new information that
bears on determinations of offenders’ just deserts and sentences.
The harm caused by the offense and the offender’s mental state
are generally considered central to desert determinations.119 As
time continues on, new research and developments may reveal
insights about how a particular victim, or the public in general,
has been harmed by an offense. Research might also provide us
with new information about the offender’s psychological makeup
that could affect the extent to which he engaged in the offense
voluntarily or with the requisite mental state. Further, certain
niche varieties of retributivism may incorporate new information
into their desert calculi. For example, “character retributivism”
views an offender’s desert as “a function not merely of [his]
wrongful acts, but also of the ultimate state of [his] character”120—
something that could have evolved during his years of confinement.
Under this distinctive view, an offender’s rehabilitation—
something ordinarily considered utilitarian in nature—might be a
relevant reason to resentence. New information might also reveal
that there were defects in an offender’s original sentencing, such
as that it was influenced by racism, sexism, or other illegitimate
factors. It could also illuminate errors in translating actual desert
into an imposed sentence, such as if it comes to light that the
conditions of an offender’s confinement are worse than the
sentencer anticipated—or if they have become worse over time.121
Under these circumstances, even an accurate assessment of
desert could result in a sentence that was too harsh because the
119 See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1383, 1408 (2002) (explaining that “[r]etributivism limits attention to an offender’s
mental state, conduct, and the harm he caused”); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 1421, 1445 (2004) (stating that retributive punishment “should be commensurate
to the seriousness of the wrong and [the offender’s] blameworthiness in committing it”);
Ryan, Proximate Retribution, supra note 96, at 1062-63.
120 See Murphy, supra note 115, at 149. This forward-looking variety of
retribution, though, is not widely accepted in practice. See John Tasioulas, Repentance
and the Liberal State, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 503 (2007) (“[C]haracter retributivism
is a deeply problematic theory.”); cf. Murphy, supra note 115, at 151 (stating that
character retributivism does not often animate criminal codes but noting that the
character examination it involves might be more relevant at sentencing).
121 Whether such conditions of confinement are or should be considered
relevant to desert determinations is debatable.
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conditions of confinement were unknown at the time of
sentencing. If new information can better inform desert
assessments or the translation of desert into actual sentences,
then revisiting the initial sentence may indeed be appropriate on
retributive grounds. But changing societal assessments of desert
based on wavering moral intuitions rather than new, relevant
information is not a legitimate retributive ground on which to
take a second look at offenders’ sentences.
In some sense, the passage of time could also be useful in
providing space to guard against sentencers acting
inappropriately out of passion rather than remaining objective
and neutral in assessing desert. A sentencing decision inflamed
by passion could be more akin to one made out of vengeance than
one rooted in retributivism, which is based on passionless and
community-based notions of desert.122 This idea of allowing
punishers’ inflamed passions to subside before deciding a
defendant’s life course is similar to the notion that pretrial
publicity impedes a defendant’s right to a fair trial. In the
infamous case of Sheppard v. Maxwell,123 for example, defendant
Sam Sheppard—the doctor who allegedly “bludgeoned [his
pregnant wife] to death” and whose story is said to have inspired
the television series and film The Fugitive124—claimed that “the
massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his
prosecution” deprived him of a fair trial.125 The Supreme Court
concluded that the “carnival atmosphere” of the courtroom did
violate Sheppard’s due process right to a fair trial and that courts
can take a number of prophylactic measures to avert such a
122 See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 367 (1981) (stating
that “[r]evenge involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the suffering of
another, while retribution either need involve no emotional tone, or involves another
one, namely, pleasure at justice being done”); Stephanos Bibas, Criminal (In)justice
and Democracy in America, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 134, 141 (2013) (stating that
retribution “is a reflective, impartial, proportional moral judgment, while [revenge] is a
hot, unchecked passion”); Ryan, Proximate Retribution, supra note 96, at 1053-56
(distinguishing vengeance from the “just deserts” of retributivism).
123 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
124 See Sam Sheppard Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/
people/sam-sheppard-12987136 [http://perma.cc/B93W-248T] (last visited Dec. 11, 2015); cf.
JACK P. DESARIO & WILLIAM D. MASON, DR. SAM SHEPPARD ON TRIAL: THE PROSECUTORS
AND THEMARILYN SHEPPARDMURDER 7-8, 324 (2003) (noting that Sheppard was found not
guilty in his second trial and also explaining that, in the later-filed civil suit seeking a
declaration that Sheppard was innocent and had been wrongfully imprisoned, the state
prevailed); Fox Butterfield, DNA Test Absolves Sam Sheppard of Murder, Lawyer Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/05/us/dna-test-absolves-sam-
sheppard-of-murder-lawyer-says.html [http://perma.cc/4AWR-RTWV] (“New DNA evidence
taken from the exhumed body of Dr. Sam Sheppard provides the most compelling piece of
evidence that he was wrongfully convicted of murdering his wife in a trial that transfixed
America more than four decades ago . . . .”).
125 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 335.
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scenario.126 One important measure that trial courts might
employ to avoid this prejudice is to “continue the case until the
threat [of prejudice due to pretrial publicity] abates.”127 The theory
is that the passage of time will allow the media attention, along
with the public’s impassioned response to the crime, to subside
before the defendant faces the jury deciding his fate. In the same
way, perhaps a sentencer further removed in time from the
commission of the offense can look more objectively at the
defendant and his crime and better determine the offender’s
proper desert. Neither the text of nor the comments to section
305.6 suggest that this was a consideration in drafting the
provision, however.128 And a resentencing after fifteen years have
elapsed is perhaps excessively protective in this regard. Moreover,
the time that it ordinarily takes an offender to be sentenced—a
median of over seven months in the federal system129—may be
sufficient to dull inflamed passions so that sentencing is rooted in
passionless and objective desert rather than vengeance.
Despite these possible benefits stemming from the passage
of time, the original public is often still better positioned to assess
desert. But this is not to say that the current public is not
impacted by the length of offenders’ sentences. It is certainly the
current public that pays the price of securing, feeding, housing,
and medically treating offenders. And these often exorbitant costs
are one of the driving forces of back-end release mechanisms like
second-look sentencing. Further, the current public will likely be
affected by released prisoners’ reintegration into the community.
Longer sentences may make reintegration more difficult because
the prisoners have been in a different, and possibly criminogenic,
environment for a longer period of time.130 Moreover, it ends up
126 Id. at 335, 358.
127 Id. at 363.
128 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011).
129 See U.S. DIST. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, at 1 tbl.D-6 (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-6/judicial-business/2014/09/30 [http://perma.cc/
E33D-BLA4] (placing the “[m]edian [t]ime . . . [f]rom [c]ommencement to [t]ermination
for [c]riminal [d]efendants [d]isposed of . . . [d]uring the 12-[m]onth [p]eriod [e]nding
September 30, 2014,” at 7.0 months); U.S. DIST. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, at 1
tbl.D-12, (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-12/judicial-business/
2014/09/30 [http://perma.cc/Z92F-6MRY] (placing the “[m]edian [t]ime from [c]onviction to
[s]entencing for [c]riminal [d]efendants [c]onvicted [d]uring the 12-[m]onth [p]eriod [e]nding
September 30, 2014,” at 99 days); see also, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURTS, NATIONAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD PROFILE (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18187/download
[http://perma.cc/T3R8-ZZXX] (recording that the median time period from filing to
disposition in criminal felony cases from April 1, 2014, to March 31, 2015, was 7.6 months).
130 See Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV.
1049, 1053-54 (2008) (“tentative[ly] conclu[ding] . . . that we may be at or near a
tipping point where further increases in incarceration will actually generate more
crime than they prevent”).
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being the current public that actually does the punishing.
Although some people would like to lock up offenders and throw
away the keys—cease thinking about the offenders anymore at
all131—there is a continuous daily aspect to carrying out a
sentence. One might argue, then, that the current public should
have a say in whether it is required to continue executing the
same sentence that was imposed by the original public. This is a
valid point: Is continuing to punish an offender really worth the
significant resources that we, the current public, invest in the
punishment? This question is one of utilitarianism, though. From
a Kantian perspective, the current public should perhaps have a
say in whether to continue carrying out an old sentence because
the current public may not have the same obligation to punish
that the original public had.132 But that does not change the fact
that the offender may deserve the punishment.
Perhaps the drafters of section 305.6 did provide some
consideration for the original public. The section states that
“[n]otice of the sentence-modification proceedings should be
given to the relevant prosecuting authorities and any victims, if
they can be located with reasonable efforts, of the offenses for
which the prisoner is incarcerated.”133 This may be an effort to
account for harm to the original public that the offender
131 Cf. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, supra note 45, at 1277 (suggesting
that “[s]ociety’s need to distance itself” from death row inmates likely helps explain
why death row inmates are not provided with the same liberties—such as
rehabilitative services—as the general prison population).
132 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 106 (Mary Gregor ed.,
1996). Kant suggests that community members may have an obligation to punish
deserving individuals. He states that:
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its members
(e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse
throughout the world), the last murderer remaining in prison would first
have to be executed, so that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and
blood guilt does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this
punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this
public violation of justice.
Id.
133 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6(6) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011). In the 2015 Council Draft, the drafters recommended modifying this
language to provide that notice “be given to victims, if they can be located with
reasonable efforts, and to the relevant prosecuting authorities.” MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 305.6 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 5, 2015); see also supra note 6
(noting the status of the 2015 Council Draft). The modified language also states that
“[a]ny victim’s impact statement from the original sentencing shall be considered by
the judicial panel or other judicial decisionmaker.” MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §
305.6 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 5, 2015). Moreover, it provides that “[v]ictims
shall be afforded an opportunity to submit a supplemental impact statement, limited to
changed circumstances since the original sentencing.” Id. The new language arguably
provides greater consideration for victim perspectives in determining what an
offender’s new appropriate sentence might be.
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caused. Indeed, victims are some of the individuals harmed by
the criminal offender. The statute’s caveat that victims need to
be notified only “if they can be located with reasonable
efforts,”134 however, sheds some doubt on the extent to which
such a provision would account for the victims’ views on the
wrongfulness of the offender’s conduct. Further, many of the
offenses contemplated by section 305.6 as deserving of a second
look—such as drug offenses and euthanasia—are offenses for
which there very well may be no identifiable victims.135 Of
course, the criminalization of an activity—whether that be
murder or jaywalking—suggests the legislature has
determined that the general public is also harmed in some way
by an offender’s criminal conduct. Without a robust accounting
of victims’ perspectives, there is a risk that some of the harms
caused by offenders will be overlooked or undervalued in
second-look sentencing. Although prosecutors are charged with
representing the public’s interests at trial, prosecutors, like
resentencing judges (or other decisionmakers), will most likely
represent the interests of the current public rather than the
original public. After all, it is the current public to which these
prosecutors must answer, and it is the current public that pays
their salaries. It is also the current public that will vote on
their re-elections, where applicable. But prosecutors are not the
only actors charged with protecting the public against harmful
criminal acts; the legislature does so by enacting criminal laws
and assessing the seriousness of criminal offenses through setting
statutory sentencing ranges, promulgating mandatory minimum
sentences in certain circumstances, and in some jurisdictions,
charging sentencing commissions with establishing sentencing
guidelines that reflect offense-seriousness determinations.
Because section 305.6 does not require a new legislative
assessment of punishment and resentencers are not beholden to
mandatory minimum sentences,136 however, the legislature—
either original or current—has very little role in reassessments of
desert under section 305.6. As a result, representatives of the
original public—those often most capable of determining offense
seriousness at time zero—are wholly left out of section 305.6
resentencing assessments.
134 Id.
135 See id. § 305.6 cmt. b (stating that, “[i]n recent decades, . . . there has been
flux in community attitudes toward many drug offenses, homosexual acts as criminal
offenses, and even crime categories as grave as homicide, such as when a battered
spouse kills an abusive husband, or cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide”).
136 See id.
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Criticizing section 305.6’s neglect of the original public
raises the question of whether having the current public—
through the vehicle of a judge or jury—decide questions of
punishment is any more troubling than having a legislature
decide the bounds of crime and punishment and then making
those laws retroactive. For example, a state legislature may decide
to decriminalize the use and possession of marijuana. The
legislature may further decide to make that decriminalization
retroactive such that anyone in prison for use or possession of
marijuana could go free. This might be a legitimate policy choice on
the part of the legislature. It would likely be one rooted in the same
theory of changing societal values that is set forth in the comments
to section 305.6.137 But the legislature is more representative than
any single judge. Further, the second-look sentencing provision of
section 305.6 risks unequal treatment of individual offenders
based on who they happen to luck upon as their resentencers.
Perhaps thinking along the same lines, Frase, in responding to an
early draft of section 305.6, explained that determining whether a
shift in societal views is “sufficiently clear and substantial to justify
sentence modifications”may be a question “much more appropriate
for legislative or sentencing commission policy making and
retroactivity, which courts would then apply—with greater
consistency and legitimacy—to entire groups of offenders.”138
Beyond these concerns about what is properly within the province
of the various decisionmakers, the legislature may not be tied to
retributivism in the same way that the Model Penal Code purports
to be.139 Thus, while the legislative choice may be legitimate, it is
likely not the best body to decide what retribution requires in that
instance. Instead, the legislators in office around the time the
conduct was committed would be better positioned to know what is
a deserved response to this conduct. In the same way, section 305.6
departs from the theory of limiting retributivism that supposedly
grounds the Model Penal Code.
Perhaps the drafters of section 305.6 have intuited that
second-look sentencing actually does not respect traditional
understandings of retributivism. Aside from the drafters’
suggestion that perceptions of offense seriousness change as
society evolves, much of the discussion related to section 305.6
revolves around utilitarian considerations. The drafters explained
137 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmts. b, f (AM. LAW
INST.,Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011).
138 Frase, supra note 52, at 198. Frase further stated that “[w]hen . . . penalty
reductions or decriminalization have been enacted, the case should be governed by the
Code’s retroactivity provisions” rather than by a judicial resentencer. Id.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
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that “[a]dvancements in empirical knowledge,” “risk-assessment
methods,” and general research can improve the reliability of
deterrence assessments and rehabilitation practices.140 Indeed,
utilitarian assessments of proper punishment can benefit from
new information, even if it is acquired at a later point in time.
Further, the resentencing approach of section 305.6 is in many
ways similar to traditional parole determinations, which are also
based on utilitarian considerations of rehabilitation and future
dangerousness.141 The drafters of the provision have worked hard
to distinguish second-look sentencing from parole, explaining that
second-look sentencing “represents a fundamental departure from
the underlying theory of parole release, which supposed that most
prisoners could be rehabilitated,” and that section 305.6’s
approach “offers a wholly new institutional model . . . that
substitutes a judicial decisionmaker for the administrative parole
board.”142 As with the underlying theory of the Model Penal Code,
these comments suggest that rehabilitation is only supplemental
to the limiting retributive foundation of the Code. But section
305.6 does not hold up as a retributivism-based approach. Even if
the drafters sensed that section 305.6 is more properly a provision
rooted in utilitarian ideals, the draft remains adamant that the
provision is appropriate as relating to all the basic purposes of
punishment, including retribution. Again, the draft emphasizes
that “[t]he passage of many years can call forward every dimension
of a criminal sentence for reevaluation. On proportionality
grounds, societal assessments of offense gravity and offender
blameworthiness sometimes shift over the course of a
generation . . . .”143 In fact, the drafters arguably could not
abandon retribution as irrelevant under section 305.6, as
retribution is a major component of sentencing under the Model
Penal Code. The Code adopts limiting retributivism as its theory
of punishment, and an offender’s desert thus places upper and
140 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011).
141 The drafters of section 305.6, though, took great pains to distinguish section
305.6 resentencing from parole determinations. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 305.6 cmts. a, f (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (stating that section 305.6
“represents a fundamental departure from the underlying theory of parole release, which
supposed that most prisoners could be rehabilitated and that the parole board could discern
when rehabilitation had been achieved in individual cases,” and “emphas[izing] that § 305.6
has been designed largely out of deep dissatisfaction with the discretionary-release
framework of indeterminate sentencing systems in the United States”).
142 Id. cmt. a.
143 Id. cmt. b. The proposal also sets forth utilitarian grounds for second-look
sentencing. See id.
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lower limits on the appropriate sentence to impose.144 Utilitarian
considerations like deterrence and rehabilitation should be only
part of the analysis under this sentencing approach.145
CONCLUSION
The ALI’s proposed second-look sentencing provision
ignores a key factor in determining an offender’s desert: the
importance of the original public. The provision stipulates that
the current public should determine whether an offender’s
sentence is too long and too harsh and anoints the current public
(as represented by the current sentencing judge or other
decisionmaker) with superior powers of assessing an offender’s
desert. This approach suggests that members of the current
public—you and I—are more enlightened than previous
generations. While it is possible that we are more educated and
compassionate than our predecessors, there is little reason to
believe that we are better at accurately determining how much
punishment an offender deserves in most instances. Society’s
views of desert continue to evolve as time marches forward, but
these views do not always change in the direction of sentence
leniency; they are instead cyclical in nature. While there may be a
true or correct sentence for each offender based on desert, there is
no way to determine whether we today can come closer to that
punishment than those who decided the offender’s original
sentence. In fact, the original sentencers may in many instances
be better positioned to assess an offender’s desert because they
are likely more familiar with the harms suffered by the direct
victims and the public as a result of the offense, and the original
sentencers may have a better idea of the offender’s mental state
when committing the offense. Second-look sentencing may very
well be an enlightened approach to punishment, but, if so, it is
probably not because it can provide better assessments of desert.
Despite the importance of retributivism to sentencing under the
Model Penal Code, second-look sentencing appears not to be
motivated by retributivism. Rather, it is utilitarianism cloaked as
limiting retributivism that animates this new provision of the
Code. This makes it difficult to clearly and effectively assess the
novel proposal.
144 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007); see supra notes 16, 99-101 and accompanying text.
145 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(ii) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007).
